Abstract
the High Court, Collins J ruled that the school's hair rule was ultra vires and that the suspension was invalid. The decision was polarising and many were disappointed with the result. It was feared that the decision would prompt an upsurge in litigation against schools.
4 Surprisingly, the decision has not been the subject of much academic attention.
The decision in Battison raises two issues: the legality of school rules and the legal requirements for suspension. There is also a question as to the relationship between these two issues. In this paper, it is argued that Collins J should have first considered the validity of the rule regulating students' hair, because a finding that the rule was ultra vires makes the suspension issue moot.
The school rule was held to be invalid because it breached the common law requirement of certainty, and was therefore in conflict with the "general law of New Zealand". 5 Although this conclusion is not supported by any clear authority, it is argued that this finding is in line with broader theoretical conception of ruling-making. The ruling also had the net benefit of requiring schools to rethink unclear or ambiguous rules.
1 Justice Collins quashed the principal's decision to suspend Lucan. 6 While this result was open on the facts, the reasoning on which the result was based lacked clarity. It is argued that in advocating for a rights-based approach to school discipline, the judge fails to engage with contrary authority. It is pointed out that the judge's holistic analysis does not consider the particular statutory criteria in detail. Instead, an argument for improper purpose should have formed the basis for the judge's decision.
After the consideration of the two broader issues, I assess the perception that judges are now more likely to grant a review of the merits of a school discipline decision than they have in the past. The second broader issue concerned the school rule itself. Justice Collins splits this discussion into two distinct issues: first, the lawfulness of the specific hair rule; and secondly the lawfulness of school rules that attempt to regulate a student's hair. I will argue that although the judge's reasoning is underdeveloped, the end result is consistent with a broader, theoretical conception of rule making.
B Order of Analysis
It was unusual that Collins J addressed these issues in the order that he did because his conclusion on the second issue makes the first issue a moot point. Therefore, it would have been more convenient to address the hair rule first.
School discipline decisions are naturally decisions that relate to behaviour contrary to particular school rules. In this case, it was the hair rule. If the rule is itself illegal, then a court would generally be unwilling to sanction a decision that related to the enforcement of the illegal rule. 24 More specifically, "continual disobedience" to a rule that is itself unlawful cannot stand. To do its ordinary work, law must be intelligible to those who are subject to it; it must make practical sense to them at least to the extent that they can, across a wide range of application, grasp what kind of behaviour the law calls for and how it's doing so might give them some reason for complying.
In Joseph Raz's view, the avoidance of "ambiguous, vague, obscure or imprecise law" is so fundamental that it is an integral principle of the rule of law. 45 The requirement for certainty lies in the idea of personal autonomy. 46 Without legal certainty, individuals are unable to plan their lives in accordance with rules. In the context of St John's College's rules, in contrast to other uniform rules, the hair rule did not allow for parents and students to plan their affairs in accordance with the rule.
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Striking down a rule for want of certainty is not as common in New Zealand as the United
States, where the law of legal certainty is well developed and a culture of striking down legislation prevails. However, it is not without precedent in New Zealand. District planning rules have been struck down for want of certainty.
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Christianson J's desire to maintain some flexibility undoubtedly holds some weight in a broader legal context. Ordinarily, a balance must be struck between vagueness and certainty. 49 In relation to Battison and school hair rules, the consequence would simply be a higher degree of uniformity, which was presumably the goal of the hair rule. In relation to a It would be a controversial step for a judge to strike down a rule supported by the overwhelming majority of the school community.
V Critique: Suspension Decisions
Mr Melloy suspended Lucan because he considered that Lucan's refusal to cut his hair constituted "continual disobedience" and that it was a "harmful or dangerous example" to other students. 64 As a result of the suspension, the board of trustees' disciplinary subcommittee met to consider the circumstances. The committee decided that Lucan would be allowed to return to school if his hair was cut short, in accordance with the school rules, to a length that was acceptable to the principal. Rishworth, "Stand down, Suspension and Expulsion", above n 24, at 53.
Section 13 provides the purposes of the provisions that govern school discipline decisions.
These are: (i) to provide a range of responses for cases of varying degrees of seriousness;
(ii) to minimise the disruption to a student's attendance at school and facilitate the return of a student when appropriate; and (iii) to ensure that individual cases are dealt with in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
Section 14 is the operative provision. It provides that the principal may stand-down or suspend a student if satisfied on reasonable grounds that: (i) a student's gross misconduct or continual disobedience is a harmful or dangerous example to other students at the school; 69 or (ii) because of the student's behaviour, it is likely that the student or other students at the school, will be seriously harmed if the student is not stood-down or suspended.
If a student is suspended, the school's board of trustees will decide on the appropriate course of action. In this way the board acts as a check on the principal's power under s 14. 80 However, he concludes that placing too much emphasis on the UNCRC is a red herring. Of particular relevance is art 3 which states that the "best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration". Rishworth qualified this right by suggesting that it applies to children collectively, and not just about the child facing disciplinary action. 81 As such, it may be that it is in the interests of children collectively that the child be disciplined pursuant to the Act. Furthermore, "best" does not mean "primary", the UNCRC allows for a multi-faceted analysis. 82 Rishworth suggests that the relevant sections of the Act are clear and reflect a policy decision to balance individual and community interests. In any event, he forcefully argues that if the Act is applied correctly (with due regard to the purposes in s 13), the result will be a decision consistent with the UNCRC. 83 This approach is supported by the fact that the Education Amendment Act 1998 was, in part, a response to New Zealand ratifying the UNCRC.
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The argument for a more interventionist approach to school discipline that is more willing to assess the merits of a decision is contrary to authority. 
Application of Section 14(1)(a)
Mr Melloy's decision was held to be invalid for three reasons: first, principals must ensure that serious disciplinary consequences are reserved for truly serious cases; 89 secondly, in school disciplinary cases, principals must ensure that penalties are such that the student's absence from school is minimised; 90 and thirdly, the Act requires some objective evidence that the suspension was necessary to protect other students from a harmful or dangerous example. 91 It will be argued that the first reason is not well founded because the judge erroneously relied on Syms which considered the "gross misconduct" ground. An unfortunate consequence of this is that the judge did not clarify the meaning of the term "continual disobedience". Instead, it will be argued that his Honour's conclusion should have been founded on an improper purpose argument. The potential complications of the judge's third reason will also be pointed out.
It must be said from the outset that it is not helpful to an analysis of the case that Collins J's judgement does not make reference to any case that has been decided under the current legislative scheme. Previous case law has emphasised the different requirements for the three grounds 92 on which a suspension or stand-down can be based. 93 From his analysis, the judge appears to blur the "gross misconduct" and "continual disobedience" grounds, indicating he may not have appreciated the importance of this distinction. First, the interpretation that suspension can only be used as a measure of last resort where the student's conduct will seriously impact on the welfare and safety of other students suggests that there is no discretion and that where grounds to suspend exist, the principal must suspend the student in question. Syms makes clear that the use of the word "may" in s 14 confers a discretion on principals. The exercise of this discretion is an indispensable step in the process of standing down or suspending a student. 99 This was at the heart of McGechan J's reasoning.
Secondly, Syms specifically addressed fixed rules in the context of the "gross misconduct"
ground. In the case, M and R had been caught drinking a small quantity of alcohol on a school skiing trip, contrary to school rules. 100 Both were suspended for an unspecified time by the rector. 101 The judgment contains extensive discussion of the "gross misconduct" given. Justice Collins simply accepted that Lucan's conduct constituted "disobedience", and that it was probably "continued". 115 It has been suggested that the notion of "entrenched behaviour" may be seen as a definition of "continual disobedience". 116 Linguistically, misconduct has more serious connotations than disobedience, particularly "gross misconduct". It would be safe to assume that "continual" would suggest a pattern of behaviour that is contrary to school rules. This would suggest that when compared to "gross misconduct", "continual disobedience" would relate to less serious behaviour that probably extends over a greater period of time.
The approach by the Court of Appeal in Edwards provides some insight into whether Lucan's conduct in this case can readily be said to constitute "continual disobedience". The cases are, on their facts, largely indistinguishable. In fact, in that case, Phillip Edwards, who had been suspended after refusing to cut his hair, also argued that the suspension was not legitimate because it was not "from incorrigible disobedience an injurious example to other We accept that the length of a boy's hair may not be a very serious matter for many of us and that our experiences with young people show that views vary widely about such things.
However, the Court pointed out that: 119 the case of Phillip Edwards became much more than an issue of the length of his hair. It became a test between him and the school as to whether a resolution of the board formally made was to be obeyed by him.
This interpretation of similar facts suggests that it could reasonably be considered that Lucan's continual disobedience, 120 in refusing to cut his hair, could be seen a harmful example to other students, thus satisfying the statutory criteria.
(c) Character of the school
While it does not appear to have been argued, the character of the particular school could be relevant in determining the meaning of "gross misconduct or continual disobedience
[that] is a harmful or dangerous example to other students." 121 Clearly, the point has been established that the circumstances of the behaviour will be relevant in determining whether the behaviour constitutes "gross misconduct", 122 and presumably "continual disobedience".
The Court of Appeal in Bovaird affirmed that the personal circumstances of a student will be relevant in the exercise of discretion. 
B Traditional Position
In 2008, Rishworth suggested that no New Zealand school disciplinary review case has ever succeeded on the grounds of substance, i.e. no case had ever been successful purely because the suspension was "irrational", "unreasonable" or "disproportionate". 158 Traditionally, administrative decisions were only reviewable on their merits if the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have ever reached that conclusion. 159 Caldwell reports that only four judicial challenges to school discipline decisions were reported in the 50 years prior to his 2006 article. 160 As Collins J points out in Battison, the courts were "hesitant to enter into the fray of school disciplinary proceedings". At [30] . This conclusion confuses the common meaning with a distinct statutory concept. There is no suggestion the boys were going to be legally stood-down upon return. Once it is recognised that the Act is not engaged on the facts, the decision should be viewed in a separate light. There is no authority for quashing a disciplinary decision short of a stand-down in New Zealand.
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"Principals dealing with more legal disputes" Radio New Zealand (online ed, Wellington, 6 July 2015). We stress the this finding of invalidity is borne out of the failure to identify whether the second suspension was a result of gross misconduct or continual disobedience. We make no comment as to whether the conduct complained of met the criteria set out in s 14(1). His Honour suggested (at [6] ) that "an allegation of predetermination is an allegation of actual bias". In both Syms (at 716) and Auckland Grammar (at 738,742) it was emphasised that although decisions were rigidly following school rules, they were made in good faith.
taken into account by the Principal. These factors, and the weight attributed to them, are matters for the principal.
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The three recent cases just described all maintain a strong focus on process rather than merits. In reading the decisions, maintaining this focus is at the forefront of the court's reasoning. In this way, it should be concluded that Battison merely represents an aberration in the judicial review of school discipline.
VII Conclusion
Battison v Melloy was a polarising case that played out as much in the media as it did in court. Amongst many in the public, the decision seemingly stood for the proposition that a judge knew more about running a school than a principal. Of course, the situation is much more complex than that.
In this paper, each aspect of the decision has been broken down and critiqued. The three issues that Collins J decided were amalgamated into analysis of the hair rule and the school discipline decisions. The relationship between these two general issues was also discussed.
The decision that the hair rule was ultra vires because it did not comply with the requirements set out in the Education Act was analysed. Several points were raised, including the school's response to the Battison decision. It was concluded that while the judge's reasoning was underdeveloped, the result was consistent with a broader, theoretical conception of rule-making.
The judge's reasoning with regards to the school discipline decision was more difficult. It is perhaps a reflection of the maxim, hard cases make bad law. The judge's legal justification for the expansive approach was not supported by authority. The application of s 14 (1) Finally, the question was posed whether Battison is representative of a sea change in the judicial oversight of school discipline decisions. In the end, analysis of the case law suggested that Battison is a departure from earlier legal authority, and a more process driven approach is still generally favoured.
While this paper has sought to comprehensively critique the approach taken in Battison, that is not to say that the judge's approach is necessarily wrong with regards to policy factors. It may well be that in future, Parliament may intervene to create a mechanism whereby the special competence of principals is better balanced with an increased desire to review school discipline decisions on their merits. In this way Battison can be seen as a fork in the road.
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